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Prologue
The  short  answer  to  the  question  in  the  title 
is  that  we  are  in  fact  doing  sociology,  but 
sociology  of  a  particular  kind.  Let  me  call 
that  kind  of  sociology  ‘ethnomethodology’  or 
EM.  This  claim  is  controversial  because  most 
sociologists do not recognise EM as a bona fide 
form  of  sociology,  and  most  EM  practitioners 
do  not  want  it  to  count  as  such.  I  think  EM, 
from  which  conversation  analysis  emerged  in 
the first place, is not only a kind of sociology 
but a radically alternative social theory. In fact, 
I suspect that there may only be two kinds of 
social theory: EM and the others. So my basic 
message  [to  the  conference]  is:  you  cannot 
branch out without roots. And those roots have 
to do with what I will call ‘field propositions’: 
basic  assumptions  about  the  sort  of  thing  we 
might take a society to be.
ABSTRACT:  Here  I  offer  a  reminder  of  some  of  the  phenomenological  and 
ethnomethodological roots of conversation analysis (CA) in the form of a set of ‘field 
propositions’. Over the years, CA has certainly ‘branched out’ from those roots. 
However, I believe a reminder is timely if we are to prevent a drift towards a rather 
mechanistic approach to the study of everyday cultural objects such as conversations 
and their ilk.
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Field propositions
In  his  third  volume  of  his  lectures  on  Nietzsche,  Martin  Heidegger 
argues as follows:
Every science rests upon propositions about the area of beings 
within which its every investigation abides and operates. These 
propositions about beings—about what they are—propositions 
that posit and delimit the area, are metaphysical propositions. 
Not only can they not be demonstrated by the concepts and 
proofs of the respective sciences, they cannot even be thought 
appropriately in this way at all. (Heidegger, 1987, pp. 41-42)
Heidegger, I think tellingly, calls these ‘field propositions’ (1987, p. 
42). The sciences use such things. Metaphysics, by contrast, reflects 
upon and questions them. The field propositions of the sciences, that 
is, are among (but do not exhaust) the ‘objects’ of the ‘discipline’ of 
philosophy. But can the scientist—in this case, the social scientist—
carry out such a reflection at all, under any circumstances? Heidegger 
tells us that:
To be able to carry out metaphysical reflection concerning his 
field, the scientific researcher must therefore transpose himself 
into a fundamentally different kind of thinking; he must become 
familiar  with  the  insight  that  this  reflection  on  his  field  is 
something essentially different from a mere broadening of the 
kind of thinking otherwise practiced in research, whether that 
broadening be in degree or scope, in generalization, or even in 
what he sees as a degeneration. (1987, p. 43)
So we should not be afraid of the word ‘metaphysics’ (and even less 
of ‘theory’). Phobias of this kind merely turn us away from finding out 
what our foundational field propositions are. They leave us stranded in 
a purely ‘ontic’ domain of empirical investigation for its own sake. In 
CA, this tendency is sometimes called ‘droning through transcripts’. 
So, then, let us revisit our unashamedly metaphysical roots, starting 
with the seminal phenomenological work of Alfred Schütz.
Schütz
For  Alfred  Schütz,  all  sociological  theories  are  effectively  answers 
to  the  question:  How  is  social  order  possible?  Their  axiomatic 
(pre-investigative)  answers  to  this  question  constitute  their  ‘field 17
propositions’. To make this clear, Schütz (1962, pp. 4-7) distinguishes 
between first- and second-order constructs. Constructs of the first order 
belong to the natural sciences. That is, the objects before the natural 
scientist such as atoms, capybaras, and planets have not interpreted 
themselves prior to the scientist’s arrival. They are incapable of doing 
so.  And  so,  the  natural  scientist  makes  a  first-order  interpretation 
of them. By contrast, constructs of the second order belong to the 
social  sciences.  When  the  social  scientist  arrives  on  the  scene,  the 
objects he or she encounters (folks in society) have already interpreted 
themselves. They have perfectly good and sufficient descriptions of 
themselves,  unlike  atoms,  capybaras,  and  planets.  This  distinction 
makes the social sciences’ proper objects very different from those of 
the natural sciences. Positivism (also known as ‘physics envy’) will not 
wash. Not ever: simply because of this fundamental and ineradicable 
difference between what the natural scientist and the social scientist, 
respectively, choose to study.
And yet, almost all varieties of sociology, including some interactionist 
and  ethnographic  versions,  ignore  this  first  and  fundamental  ‘field 
proposition’. They are consequently left with an eternally unrequitable 
desire to be like the natural sciences, and with a strange set of topics 
(sometimes confusingly called ‘macro’ topics) that are properly the 
preserve of politics and economics. Such things as ‘race’, ‘class’, and 
‘gender’ come to mind here, but a host of others can be found in just 
about every basic textbook. As Eric Livingston (2008, pp. 123-129) 
has recently reminded us, these are all typical of ‘sociologies of the 
hidden social order’. By contrast, the basic Schützian field proposition 
(and those that follow) steer us in the direction of a ‘sociology of the 
witnessable social order’.
Garfinkel
Expanding on Schütz’s fundamental insight, Garfinkel (1967) argued 
and  showed  that  the  predescribed  character  of  practical  social 
actions  can  and  ought  to  be  the  proper  object  of  sociological 
investigation. However, he took this insight further by showing that 
that predescribability is actually materially incarnate in social practices 
themselves.  That  is,  as  folks  in  the  society  (ethnos)  go  about  their 
everyday  practical  affairs,  their  actions  and  practices  overtly  (that 
is,  audio-visually  or  witnessably)  display  their  own  methodical  basis. 
This incarnateness of the methodical properties of practical actions is 
therefore reflexive (it is done in and as the very actions that it grounds 
and describes) and therefore constitutes a form of accountability. And 
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this—counter to Durkhiem in particular and to mainstream sociology 
in general—is, for Garfinkel, how social order is possible in the first 
place. It is possible, that is, precisely because it is prebuilt into everyday 
social affairs.
Wes Sharrock (1995, p. 4) has put this very neatly indeed with his 
example of the ways in which an ordinary action—waiting for a bus 
and forming a bus queue—accountably and reflexively displays that 
this is what it, in fact, in practice, is:
Social order is easy to find because it’s put there to be found. 
When you go about your actions ... you do them so that (or in 
ways that) other people can see what you’re doing. You do your 
actions to have them recognized as the actions that they are. 
When you stand at the bus stop, you stand in such a way that 
you can be seen to be waiting for a bus. People across the street 
can see what you’re doing, according to where and how you’re 
standing....  [Y]ou’re  standing  at  a  bus  stop  and  somebody 
comes and stands next to you and they stand in such a way that 
eventually you can see that these people are standing in a line 
and that one person’s the first and another is the second, and 
some person’s at the end. People stand around at bus stops in 
ways they can be seen to be waiting for a bus.
Social practice, of whatever kind, from waging wars to cutting one’s 
toenails, carries with it an account (which, as the above case shows, 
need not be verbal) of what it is, in and as that specific social practice 
and  not  some  other.  It  is  accountable.  Accountability  is  a  general 
and radically alternative answer to the question of how social order 
(including its failures) is possible. Social practices can, therefore—via 
their  necessary  accountability—be  seen  to  have  reflexive  properties 
when viewed in terms of their methodic properties. We will return to 
these central characteristics of the ethnomethodological conception 
of social order after looking at Harvey Sacks’s distinctive contribution 
to it.
Sacks
Since Sacks is widely acknowledged as the founder of CA and since his 
big book is entitled Lectures on Conversation (Sacks, 1992a; 1992b), it 
might seem odd for me to claim that his main aim was not so much 
the analysis of conversation as such—significant as this may be—but 
rather the establishment of a new way of doing a sociology of culture 19
based on his own version of EM’s fundamental field propositions. Still, 
it is interesting to look at the variety of materials Sacks uses in his 
lectures: not just transcribed conversations (which are ubiquitous), but 
also newspaper and magazine articles, ethnographic accounts, training 
manuals  for  psychotherapists  ...  and  so  on,  through  a  very  broad 
variety of effectively ‘found’ objects that, as Sacks repeatedly says, he 
‘just happened to have’ (e.g., 1992a, p. 292). Indeed, one of his most 
famous cases is not a conversation at all; it is a story by a young child 
and it led to what is now called ‘membership categorisation analysis’ 
(Sacks,  1972).  I  get  the  sense  from  reading  Sacks  that  transcribed 
conversations  were,  for  him,  conveniently  available  examples  of 
‘fragments’ of everyday social action, that anything so readily available 
would have done in their place, and that conversations ought not to 
be thought of in any way as particularly privileged objects or materials. 
If other materials came to hand, Sacks was not reluctant to use them. 
But what is the status of such ‘fragments’, conversational or otherwise? 
Are they merely ‘micro’ bits of flotsam that happened to have drifted 
into Sacks’s office and out again into the lecture hall? I think not, and 
with some reason.
Sacks’s view of such things was that cultures exhibit ‘order at all points’ 
or ‘in all venues’ (1992a, p. xlvi). That is, if you have an instance of 
the  generally  available  (and  witnessably  available)  ‘machinery’  that 
generates cultural objects such as bus queues, psychiatric diagnoses, or 
recycled turn beginnings, then any instance will do. Instances do not 
have to be aggregated, statistically or otherwise. If the cultural order 
is visible there, it will be visible in every instance. Schegloff puts this 
succinctly in his introduction to the first volume of the Lectures (Sacks, 
1992a, p. xlvi):
This view [order at all points], rather like the ‘holographic’ model 
of information distribution, understands order not to be present 
only  at  aggregate  levels  and  therefore  subject  to  an  overall 
differential distribution, but to be present in detail on a case by 
case, environment by environment basis. A culture is not then to 
be found only by aggregating all of its venues; it is substantially 
present in each of its venues.
This being so, we can be doing highly significant work on cultural 
ordering  as  a  whole  from  the  examination  of  the  fragments  we 
happen to have to hand. And, to some extent, this is what underpins 
the massive reproducibility of CA findings over the years, albeit that 
this can be, in some hands, a quite dreary repetition rather than an 
excitingly scientific repeatability.
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Further  to  this,  Sacks  effectively  (perhaps  under  the  influence  of 
Garfinkel) solved a major problem in the study of culture. I call this the 
problem of production and recognition, though Sacks himself sometimes 
uses  slightly  different  terms.  The  problem  runs  something  like  this: 
cultural  members  produce  (or  ‘generate’)  cultural  objects  as  very 
specific things. For example, there can be a fine line between a threat 
and a promise; between discarding some rubbish and ‘thoughtfully’ 
disposing of it, between ‘weeding’ a garden and decimating it. And so 
on for the myriad forms of fine work we have to carry out as competent 
cultural members. It becomes important, then, that the objects we 
produce should be recognised by other members to be exactly what 
they were produced as and not some other (albeit proximate) thing. 
How  can  this  be  achieved?  There  have  been  many  proposals  for  a 
solution,  quite  a  few  of  them—including  Schütz’s  own  ‘reciprocity 
of  perspectives’  (1962,  pp.  11-13)—predicated  on  some  form  of 
intentionality  or  other  ghostly  internal  process.  Sacks’s  solution,  by 
contrast, is utterly materialistic and takes us back to the critical level 
of methods. It is the identical array of methods or ‘procedures’ that 
competent  members  use  for  both  the  production  and  recognition 
(or  ‘generation’  and  ‘detection’)  of  cultural  objects  that  makes  this 
possible. As Sacks (1992a, p. 226) puts it, ‘A culture is an apparatus for 
generating recognizable actions; if the same procedures are used for 
generating as for detecting, that is perhaps as simple a solution to the 
problem of recognizability as is formulatable’.
Accordingly, I am ultimately urging conversation analysts to remember 
these ‘roots’—to go beyond the mere collecting and noticing of the 
countless  conversational  ‘find-ables’  and  to  give  some  thought  to 
the ways in which these fragments may be part of the ‘witnessable 
social order’, as we have already seen Livingston (2008) refer to it. 
The  work  that  lies  ahead  involves  some  important  respecifications 
of  conversational  materials—indeed  of  any  materials  we  happen  to 
have to hand. How, if we are interested in fragments of talk, are we 
to  describe  their  critical  elements  of  accountability/reflexivity  and 
methodicity? To ignore the question is to forget the sociological aspect 
of our endeavours. So, as purely assembled reminders, I offer a brief set 
of axioms that I think, on the basis of the above discussion, can form 
the ‘field propositions’ of what we might be about.
Fundamental field propositions of EM
1. Axiom of Accountability
A =def ƒr(P,R)21
Accountability is a reflexive function of (methods for) the Production 
and Recognition of cultural objects.
2. Axiom of Methodicity
(P,R) = m1 ... mn
Production and Recognition consist in the indefinite array of possible 
methods for their mutual (reflexive) accomplishment.
3. Axiom of Description
EM = ∂(m1, m2, m3, m4 ...)
Ethnomethodology  is  a  description  (∂)  of  specific  instances  of  the 
methodic array insofar as they can be captured in, as, or via, actual 
audio-visual—that is, witnessable—materials.
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